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Perverse incentives for banks’ traders have played a role in the financial crisis. We study how
labor market competition interacts with the structure of compensation to result in excessive
risk taking. In a model with trader moral hazard and adverse selection on trader abilities, we
demonstrate how banks optimally induce top traders to take more risk as competition on the labor
market intensifies, even if banks internalize the costs of negative outcomes. Distorting risk-taking
incentives allows banks to reduce the surplus offered to low-ability traders. We find that increasing
bank capital requirements does not unambiguously reduce risk taking by top traders.
1. Introduction
 The financial crisis has been attributed partly to perverse incentives for traders at banks. High
bonuses for above-average performance drove traders to engage in riskier trading strategies. Short-
term trading gains which in reality were compensation for high downside risk were disguised as
profits resulting from above average trader abilities, so it has been argued.1
Why did banks offer huge bonuses, inducing their traders to take excessive risk? Clearly, one
explanation is that banks simply did not internalize the negative effects of risk, being protected by
implicit bailout guarantees. In this article, we explore another channel: the role of competition on
the labor market for traders in shaping risk-taking incentives from trader bonuses. This analysis is
inspired by claims that, even with value-maximizing bank managers, trader compensation could
be excessively high powered as a result of strong competition among banks in hiring top traders.2
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Anecdotal evidence of such competition abounds. In April 2010, Kaspar Villiger, chairman of
the Swiss bank UBS, defended the firm’s generous pay plans to angry shareholders by saying that
an earlier move to cut compensation had backfired. When an entire team of 60 employees had
left UBS investment bank’s equities unit, he said, “We cut back too much last year, causing us
to lose entire teams, their clients and the corresponding revenue.”3 When Warren Buffet stepped
in at Salomon Brothers in the 1990s after the firm had gotten into trouble, he tried to realign
perverse compensation practices. This resulted in defections of top bankers, and eventually a
reversal of the reforms. In his statement for the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in 2010,
Buffett remarked: “I can just tell you, being at Salomon personally, it’s just, it’s a real problem
because the fellow can go next door or he can set up a hedge fund or whatever it may be. You
don’t, you don’t have a good way of having some guy that produces x dollars of revenues to give
him 10% of x because he’ll figure out, he’ll find some other place that will give him 20% of x or
whatever it may be.” In an article in the Financial Times, a banker is quoted saying, “The bonuses
are crazy—we all know that. But we don’t know how to stop paying them without losing our best
staff” (Tett, 2009).
The idea, however, raises an immediate question. It is clear that increased competition for
traders raises their expected remuneration. Indeed, such an effect has been found empirically for
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation by Bereskin and Cicero (2013), who study a pool
of firms competing for the same talent, of which a subset receives a governance shock affecting
compensation level. However, it is less clear why the need to leave a larger part of the rents to
traders should lead to a different incentive structure. Independent of competition, it would seem
that the banks would opt for the incentive structure that leads to highest overall gain, as also
observed in Inderst and Pfeil (2013).
We show that competition does increase the risk induced by traders’ incentive contracts
when there is both trader moral hazard over investment projects and adverse selection on trader
abilities. Boustanifar, Grant, and Reshef (2018) show empirically that wages in the financial
sector have increased in response to deregulation, and that this effect is stronger in environments
where asymmetric information is more severe. Evidence for the fact that traders differ in their
trading skills (and that their trading results are not merely a matter of luck) was provided by, for
instance, Berk and Green (2004). Banks use compensation schemes both to incentivize traders to
choose appropriate investment projects and to attract in particular the top traders. The latter goal
is achieved by increasing rewards for top results, which are more easily achieved by top traders.4
The downside is that this increases risk profiles sought by these top traders. As competition for
top traders increases, the importance of sorting the top traders (and avoiding paying similarly
high compensations to traders of average ability) grows, and so the benefit of increasing bonus
pay over base wage increases, whereas the costs of inducing the traders to take excessive risks
remains unchanged.
We explore this in a model in which two banks compete a` la Hotelling in hiring traders. We
assume that traders, protected by limited liability, can choose between projects that differ both
in expected return and in risk. We consider two types of traders, top traders and average traders.
Top traders are better at making high-risk investments than average traders in the sense that their
expected payout for such projects is higher. This allows banks to screen on trader type by offering
top traders contracts that reward them more strongly for high outcomes. Using this idea, we make
the following points. First, when top traders have sufficiently good outside options, the bank has to
pay these traders high wages. To prevent those high wages from spilling over to average traders,
revising employee remuneration structure: “Given the fluid market for financial talent, no single firm can get very far on
its own.”
3 Financial Times, “Chastened UBS board promises ‘sensitivity,”’ April 14, 2010.
4 As a compensation consultant, commenting on moves by traders from banks to less-regulated hedge funds, puts
it, “Your bonus doesn’t fully depend on what your book made, hence the huge amount of turnover, people whose books
are making a lot of money and feel they aren’t being compensated fairly moving to the buy-side, typically hedge funds or
private equity firms” (on news.efinancialcareers.com, August 25, 2017).
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the bank pays those wages by offering top traders more high-powered performance contracts.
Thus, banks reduce the information rents that need to be paid to average traders by distorting the
risk incentives for top traders. The downside is that this results in excessive risk taking by top
traders from the banks’ point of view.
Second, because in this model, outside options arise endogenously through competition
between banks for traders, excessive risk taking by top traders gets worse as competition for such
traders intensifies.
We then ask how regulation may help in reducing risk-taking incentives. In the wake of
the financial crisis, policy makers across the world have responded by calling for restrictions on
traders’ bonus payments.5 We find that caps on bonuses help to reduce risk taking by traders,
increase welfare, but have ambiguous effects on bank profits. On the other hand, increasing the
banks’ capital requirements does not necessarily resolve the issue that we focus on here. Although
stricter capital requirements can align the bank’s incentives more closely with society’s, we point
out that such requirements can actually increase the riskiness of top traders’ deals. The intuition
is that increasing capital requirements increases banks sensitivity to bad states of the world.
However, such outcomes result from projects initiated both by top traders and by average traders.
If the latter contribute most to downside risk, the bank will try to lose these average traders to
rival banks by decreasing their utility. Because the utilities of the two types of traders are bound
together by incentive compatibility, reducing average traders’ utility while keeping top traders’
utility constant implies increasing risk taking by top traders.
The fact that high-powered incentives can lead to excessively risky behavior has been well
established in the corporate finance literature since the seminal contribution by Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976). When corporations issue debt to outsiders, the insiders (managers, entrepreneurs)
have strong incentives to exert effort. However, as debt holders share in downside risk but do
not benefit from upside potential, such a reliance on only debt financing may induce managers
to engage in risk shifting. We show that, even in the absence of risk shifting resulting from the
bank’s capital structure, internal contracting frictions within banks still cause excessive risk in the
privately optimal contracts to top traders: banks increase risk-taking incentives to screen traders.
Our article is related to the literature on optimal contracts when both agents’ efforts and
risk choices are unobservable. Hellwig (2009) and Biais and Casamatta (1999) consider optimal
outside financing for entrepreneurs who have access to a discrete set of projects that vary in
both risk and return. Agents hide low effort by choosing projects of higher risk and hence
keep the potential for a high return. Second-best optimal contracts then induce higher risks than
first-best levels. Palomino and Prat (2003) address the analytically more challenging question of
optimal incentive contracts when there is a continuum of projects, each generating a continuum
of outcomes (but with different distributions of outcomes). In this article, instead of effort costs,
we analyse the existence of adverse selection over agent abilities.
Our second ingredient is competition between principals in the model, which leads to an
endogenous reservation wage impacting on the information rents to be left to the low types. The
observation that competition on the labor market generates endogenous reservation wages that
in turn influence principals’ decisions was also made in Acharya and Volpin (2010) and Dicks
(2012), in their analyses of externalities in the adoption of tighter corporate governance regimes.
Closest to our analysis is an article by Be´nabou and Tirole (2016), the Working Paper version
of which appeared concurrently with and independently of our own article. Similar to our work,
Be´nabou and Tirole (2016) study a Hotelling model describing labor market competition among
two horizontally differentiated employers, with employees that can be of two types. They find,
like we do, that increasing competition leads to overincentivization of the efficient workers. In
5 In April 2013, the European Union parliament passed a bonus cap for so-called material risk takers to go into
effect in 2014. The cap maximizes the level of variable pay to be the amount of fixed pay. In the United States, section
956 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires disclosure of incentive-based remuneration pay that could lead to material financial
loss and prohibits financial institutions from adopting an incentive plan that encourages inappropriate risk.
C© The RAND Corporation 2018.
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Be´nabou and Tirole (2016), workers are assumed to carry out two tasks, only one of which is
contractable. It is the latter one that gets overemphasized as competition grows, at the expense of
the noncontractable task. In contrast, our traders carry out only one task, choosing the investment
project. We show that competition leads top traders to choose projects featuring excessive risk.
A second dimension which distinguishes our article is that we consider whether a change in
the banks’ objective functions, through increasing capital requirements, can substitute for direct
intervention in pay policy.
Related work in the area of principals competing for the (exclusive) services of an agent is by
Biglaiser andMezzetti (1993). They consider two asymmetric principals with different production
technologies competing for the services of an agent of unobservable type. Though we look at
Hotelling competition between two symmetric principals, the main point of similarity is that
the agent’s outside option is determined by the contract offer from the competing principal, and
that outside option will be type dependent. Jullien (2000) explores the consequences of such type
dependent outside optionsmore generally. Closely related are also Schmidt-Mohr andVillas-Boas
(1999) and Rochet and Stole (2002) who study screening in a Hotelling competition framework.
Rochet and Stole (2002) consider product market competition with different consumer types but
no adverse selection. If the whole market is covered for all types, firms offer all types an efficient
allocation. Schmidt-Mohr and Villas-Boas (1999), like our model, does feature adverse selection
and hence the equilibrium features inefficiency. Schmidt-Mohr and Villas-Boas (1999) focus on
how changes in competition affect distortions in contracts offered. Our work adds moral hazard
on the part of the agents: screening the agents results in bonus contracts that lead agents to choose
projects that deviate from first-best.
Other related recent articles study market failures in compensation setting within banks
different from ours and argue for regulation in this area. Inderst and Pfeil (2013) and Thanassoulis
(2013) look at benefits and costs of deferral of bonus payments. Besley and Ghatak (2013)
analyze how bank bailouts affect trader compensation structures and explore how regulation may
be combined with taxation to restore proper incentives. Thanassoulis (2012) looks at the effect
of employee remuneration on bank default risk. Banks prefer large bonus components, as these
allow efficient risk sharing between bankers and the bank. Increasing competition for traders
raises compensation and increases bank default risk. Acharya, Pagano, and Volpin (2016) explore
a dynamic model of hidden trader abilities, in which increasing mobility of traders leads to slower
revelation of trader types, and incentives for average trader to churn from one firm to another in
order to hide their ability to take risk.
Finally, in our model, labor market competition creates an externality among banks, who
drive up risk-taking incentives in order to keep good traders on board. On a related note, a fire-
sale literature (e.g., Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Lorenzoni, 2008) identifies an externality among
banks through the market for asset prices: in their risk choices, banks do not take into account
the (fire-sale) effect of bad outcomes on other banks’ investments.
This article is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model for the banks
and traders. In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium in our Hotelling model with competing
banks. Section 4 discusses how capital regulation interacts with compensation structures, and
argues that direct intervention in wage contracts is called for. Finally, we offer some concluding
remarks in Section 5.
2. The model
 We consider a model of two banks, located at either end of a Hotelling line, which compete
in offering labor contracts to traders who are distributed homogeneously along the Hotelling line.
There is hidden information: traders differ in abilities to successfully complete an investment
project for the bank they are employed by. There is also hidden action: banks cannot observe
which project a trader chooses to execute, only the outcome of that project is contractable. The
C© The RAND Corporation 2018.
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FIGURE 1
PRODUCTION POSSIBILITY SETS (qL ,H0 (p), qL ,H1 (p)) FOR EACH TRADER TYPE. [Color figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
banks need to design the labor contract offers to solve both the resulting adverse selection and
the moral hazard problems.
In the following, we first discuss the investment technologies for the two trader types, top
and average traders. Then, we describe contract design and the banks’ objectives.
 Projects accessible to traders. We focus on the following adverse selection problem.
Banks face two types of employees: high skill and low skill. The skill lies in the ability to increase
the probability of a high payoff for the bank while keeping the variance in payoff in low. The
bank uses the wage/bonus structure to separate these types.
We model this as follows. Traders can choose projects p from a set of investment opportu-
nities P . The projects differ both in expected return and in risk. We model this by assuming that
all projects yield one of three outcomes,6
x1 > x0 > −x−1.
For any project p, the probabilities of each of the three possible outcomes depend on the trader
type. Traders can be either of high (H) type (“top traders”) or of low (L) type (“average traders”).
A fraction φ is L trader, 1 − φ is H trader. For a project p, the probabilities of outcomes x1,0,−1
are denoted by qH,L1 (p), q
H,L
0 (p), and q
H,L
−1 (p) = 1 − qH,L0 (p) − qH,L1 (p). Traders’ remuneration
will depend on realized outcomes, which are observable to the banks. Traders choose projects to
maximize their expected remuneration from the bank they are employed by.
The production possibility set P for each trader type is illustrated in Figure 1 in (q0, q1)
space. The figure plots the frontier (q j0 (p), q
j
1 (p)) of the project set P: highest feasible probability
q1 for given middle outcome probability q0. We assume that this boundary is decreasing, concave,
and smooth.
The intuition behind this description is that banks hire traders that have discretion over the
projects (trades) that they engage in. The trader’s job is to find investments that have a good
risk-return trade-off. This trade-off here is captured by the frontier projects. We assume that each
trader type has access to a risk-free project that has q0 = 1. In other words, x0 denotes the outcome
of the risk-free project. When moving away from the risk-free project to q0 < 1, both q1 and q−1
increase. That is, we assume that projects have a higher probability q1 of exceptionally positive
6 We think of the lowest outcome as a loss, in which case, x−1 > 0.
C© The RAND Corporation 2018.
860 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
returns x1, but at the cost of a higher risk of losses x−1, q−1 = 1 − q1 − q0. This requires that
dq1
dq0
> −1 along the curves. We also assume that dq1
dq0
< 0 everywhere on the boundary, so that a
trader always increases the probability q1 by lowering q0.
We say that projects become more risky as q0 falls. When moving left along the curves,
projects also become more risky in the sense that their variance increases.7
Furthermore, traders’ abilities to generate above-average returns by taking risks differ by
types. Top traders (high types) are better at getting a high expected return with low downside,
q−1, than average traders (low types). Top traders are those that can best identify trades with great
risk-return profiles: they can achieve higher probabilities q1 of high outcomes x1 for any given q0
than average traders do. Average traders are less adept at creating value by moving away from the
risk-free project where q0 = 1. Hence, given some value of q0 < 1, their best possible trades will
be less profitable compared to the best possible trades a top trader could do at that same level of
q0. In Figure 1, this means that q−1 increases faster (q1 increases more slowly) with q0 falling for
L traders than for H traders.
The first-best project maximizes the joint payoffs of bank and trader. That is, it solves
max
p∈P
q j1 (p)x1 + q j0 (p)x0 − q j−1(p)x−1. (1)
We assume that xi and q
j
i (.) are such that implementing “the corner solution” project
argmaxpq
j
i (p) is never optimal for any i ∈ {1, 0,−1}, j ∈ {H, L}, and therefore restrict attention






= R∗ ≡ x1 + x−1
x0 + x−1 , (2)
where the left-hand side can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution of the project set
and the right-hand side can be interpreted as a measure of risk. To illustrate, as x1 increases,
joint payoffs increase if the trader invests in more risky projects with higher probability qH1 :







In terms of Figure 1, the first-best projects are characterized by the tangent of the lines of
constant profit and the trader’s project-space boundary.
Though the optimal project will be a different one for the H trader than for the L trader, for
either type, the slope of the upper project boundary at the optimal project will be the same. These
points are shown in Figure 1 at the tangents to the boundaries (the parallel dashed lines).
 The contracts. A bank offers traders contracts to solve asymmetric information in two
dimensions. The bank does not observe the project p chosen by the trader (moral hazard), it
only observes realized outcomes. Nor can the bank observe the trader’s type (adverse selection).
The agent, that is, the trader, knows both his own type and is fully informed on the outcome
probabilities qH,Li (p) (i ∈ {−1, 0, 1}) associated with each project p.
A bank offers both H and L traders take-it-or-leave-it contracts, specifying remunerations
contingent on observed outcomes x−1, x0 and x1, which the traders then accept or reject. We
assume that traders have limited liability, so that wages under any outcome are nonnegative. We
parametrize these remunerations as a fixed transfer t H , t L in the contract targeted at H , resp.,
L traders, plus bonus payments for either trader type, wH1 , w
L




0 for the high x1 and
average x0 outcomes. Limited liability restricts t j , t j + w ji ≥ 0 for j ∈ {H, L}, i ∈ {0, 1}.
7 The derivative of the variance q0(x0 − x¯)2 + q1(x1 − x¯)2 + (1 − q0 − q1)(−x−1 − x¯)2 is larger than zero for 0 ≤
∂q1
∂q0
≤ 1 if x0 < x1; where x¯ denotes the mean return.
C© The RAND Corporation 2018.
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Given these wages, a trader of type j chooses the project p that optimizes their expected
utility,




1 + q j0 (p)w j0 + t j . (3)
In words, the bank cannot contract on p directly (moral hazard). To implement a certain project
p, the bonuses w ji need to be set so as to make it incentive compatible for the trader to choose
this project. In particular, project choice is determined by the bonus ratio in the contract, which
we define as






if w j = 0.
If w j1 = w j0 = 0, trader j gets the outcome-independent fixed wage t j and is indifferent over
project outcomes. In this case, we assume him to choose the project that maximizes the bank’s
profits. Also, we define r j to be equal to R∗ in that case.
A larger r j leads the j trader to place a higher weight on the probability of high outcomes
x1, relative to average outcomes x0. In that case, maximum trader utility (3) is attained at a lower
value of q0, and a higher value of both q1 and q−1. Higher r j thus lead traders to choose projects
with higher probability of extreme outcomes, and lower probability of an average outcome. In
this sense, we identify higher bonus ratios with higher project risk.
In what follows, it is convenient to characterize contracts in terms of the bonus ratio r j ,
which governs the trader’s choice of project, and the expected utility u j the contract offers to the
trader, instead of the bonus payments w ji along with the fixed payment t
j . Thus, (r j , t j , u j ) refers










q j0 (p) + r jq j1 (p)
)+ t j .
Let p j (r j ) denote the project p that solves j’s maximization problem.
 Bank competition for traders. We model labor market competition among banks (the
principals) for traders (the agents) by using a Hotelling model. We consider a Hotelling beach of
length 1 where L and H traders are distributed uniformly with density φ and 1 − φ, respectively.
Two symmetric banks, a and b, are located on the far left and right of the beach. Traders face a
travel cost per unit distance equal to τ L for the low type and τ H for the high type. In this case,



























where we allow the competition parameters τ L ,H to depend on trader type.
The parameter τ j > 0 captures that traders do not all switch banks because one bank pays
a bit more than the other. Other factors play a role as well; a trader may like his colleagues, one
bank may be closer to his home, reducing commute time, etc. In general, 1/τ L and 1/τ H capture
how aggressively banks compete for L and H traders, respectively.
In our context of banks’ traders, one can interpret travel costs τ j literally: banks a and
b are in different countries and workers face a cost to relocate. One can argue that in the
past decades, globalization has increased competition for traders between banks internationally.
Indeed, Boustanifar, Grant, and Reshef (2018) find that high wages in finance succeed in attracting
skilled workers across borders. If we assume that top tradersmigratemore easily, say fromLondon
to Hong Kong, than average traders, then this international competition has decreased τ H more
than τ L . Below, we analyze the effect of a fall in τ H for given τ L .
C© The RAND Corporation 2018.
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The j trader who is indifferent between working for either bank is a distance x away from
bank a and 1 − x from b, where x solves
u ja − τ j x = u jb − τ j (1 − x).
With full coverage (as we shall assume), this gives the expression for bank a’s market share
s j (u ja, u
j
b) of type j traders above.
Banks choose contract offers to maximize their total expected net profits. Bank net profit
from a trader of type j equals the sum of expected gross profits from the project undertaken by
the trader, minus the utility left to trader type j . From equation (1), we write gross profits as
π j (r j ) = q j1 (p j (r j ))(x1 + x−1) + q j0 (p j (r j ))(x0 + x−1) − x−1. (5)
To get the bank’s net profits from type j traders, we subtract the expected utility left to type j ,
u j . Bank a’s total profits equal net profits per trader-type, multiplied by the shares of each type










)− uLa )+ sH(uHa , uHb ) (π H(r Ha )− uHa ) .
Taking trader utility u j as given for a moment, the optimal projects from the point of view
of the bank coincide with the first-best. That is, profits are maximized for projects on the project
boundary (q j1 , q
j





= 1/R∗ < 1, (6)
where first-best R∗ is defined in (2). In that case, gross profits from this trader’s project equal
π j (R∗).
Throughout the analysis, we assume τ L, τ H to be sufficiently low compared to profits so that
in equilibrium, all traders accept a contract, that is, the Hotelling beach is fully covered. To assure
that this happens in equilibrium, and that full coverage also obtains if one of the banks deviates,
we make the following assumption on the magnitude of travel costs τ j relative to gross profits
π j .8
Assumption 1. π L(R∗) > 2τ L, π H (R∗) > 2τ H .
 Incentive compatibility. Let us now focus on the traders’ project choice. Trader j , in








or on an extremal point corresponding to q0 = 0 (q0 = 1) for a bonus ratio sufficiently high
(low). Hence, without asymmetric information about trader type, the bank can fully resolve moral
hazard on project choice. By setting r j = R∗, the bank induces traders to choose the bank’s
optimal project.
This will not necessarily be optimal though, when trader types are hidden. In that case,
contracts have to respect incentive compatibility (IC) with respect to the traders’ type revelation.
We use IC to refer to type revelation/adverse selection (not to moral hazard with respect to project
choice p in (3)).
8 To see why this assumption implies full coverage, consider the case where the indifferent trader x is given by






It is routine to verify that π ≥ 2τ implies that the bank would also like to employ a trader at maximum distance 1 away:
full coverage.
C© The RAND Corporation 2018.
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Consider first L’s IC constraint. When confronted with the (wH0 , w
H
1 ) compensation contract,
L chooses the project that, given bonus ratio r H , optimizes his own payoff. The L trader’s utility





qL0 (p) + r HqL1 (p)
)+ t H .
As the utility-maximizing project for either type depends only on r H , we see that the ratio of L’s
utility from bonus payments upon accepting the H contract, uˆL − t H , and H ’s expected utility
from bonus payments from the same contract, uH − t H , depends only on r H . We denote this ratio
f (r H ) ≡ q
L
0 (p
L(r H )) + r HqL1 (pL(r H ))
qH0 (pH (r H )) + r HqH1 (pH (r H ))
= uˆ
L − t H
uH − t H ≤ 1.
Because L cannot get more utility from a compensation contract than H , who has superior success
probabilities for any bonus ratio r H , we have f (r H ) ≤ 1 and f (0) = 1.
Trader L’s IC condition thus amounts to
uL ≥ uˆL = (uH − t H ) f (r H ) + t H . (8)
In order to solve the bank’s screening problem below, we follow the literature and assume
that single-crossing is satisfied. In our trader model, this means that if banks increase the bonus
w1 for the high outcome (keeping t and w0 constant), top traders benefit more than average
traders, as they are better able to find projects with higher upside—without increasing too much
the probability of negative outcomes—than average traders are.
In technical terms, we assume that when both types’ indifference curves intersect in (w j0 , r
j )-
space, the curve for H is less steep than the curve for L . Note that this condition for single-crossing
is not quite standard, as for each combinationw j0 , r
j , the agent maximizes over p. The indifference
curve is of the form
max
p
{w j0 (q j0 (p) + r jq j1 (p)) + t j} = constant. (9)
The slope of this indifference curve in (w j0 , r













Hence, to get single-crossing, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. For each r , we assume that
qH1 (p
H (r ))






The interpretation of single-crossing in this context is the following. Combining (10) and
(11), H ’s indifference curve in w0, r space is flatter than L’s indifference curve, whenever they
intersect. That is, a given increase in r leads to a bigger increase in utility h, and therefore a
bigger fall in w0—to keep utility constant—for H than for L , because H ’s trading talent makes
him benefit more from the high wH1 . In terms of Assumption 2: if both types choose their optimal
project for a given bonus ratio r , the H -type has a higher probability ratio q1/q0 than the L-type.
Put differently, H is relatively more likely to generate the high payoff x1 compared to the average
payoff x0. Hence, single-crossing captures that H is more talented and therefore better able to
exploit a high bonus ratio w1/w0.
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It follows from Assumption 2 that f ′(r ) < 0. This can be seen as follows. Using an envelope
argument with respect to p, we find that





)− qH1 (qL0 + rqL1 )(
qH0 (pH (r )) + rqH1 (pH (r ))
)2 < 0. (12)
Thus, we have f (0) = 1, f (r ) ≥ 0, and f ′(r ) < 0. To allow us to focus on first-order conditions,
we also assume that f (r ) is convex,
Assumption 3. f ′′(r ) ≥ 0.
As f (r ) is given by uˆL − t H = f (r )(uH − t H ), we can write ∂2 uˆL
∂r2
|uH = (uH − t H ) f ′′(r ). As
we show below, w j0 , w
j
1 ≥ 0 and hence, Assumption 3 implies ∂2 uˆL∂r2 |uH ≥ 0: there are decreasing
returns for the bank of using risk r to separate types.
Consider next H ’s IC condition. Following a similar argument as in the case of an L trader,
an H trader’s utility, when he chooses the L contract, equals uˆH = (uL − t L)/ f (r L) + t L . Thus,
we find that H ’s incentive-compatibility condition is
uH ≥ uˆH = u
L − t L
f (r L)
+ t L . (13)
 Traders’ outside options. We make the natural assumption that, in the absence of adverse
selection over trader types, H -type traders obtain a larger remuneration u than L-type ones.
Without adverse selection, banks could simply pay fixed wage contracts, and traders do the
optimal projects, leading to profits π H (R∗) and π L(R∗). Standard Hotelling competition between
the banks results in the following well-known utilities for the L-type and the H -type traders
(gross of their travel costs),9
uL∗ = π L(R∗) − τ L, (14)
uH∗ = π H (R∗) − τ H . (15)
In words, of total profits π ∗, traders get u∗ and banks π ∗ − u∗ = τ . Hence, the more competitive
the market for traders (the lower τ ), the more banks compete away rents to the benefit of traders.
Our assumption then amounts to
Assumption 4. π L(R∗) − τ L < π H (R∗) − τ H .
This holds, for instance, if the H -trader market is at least as competitive as the L-trader one,
τ H ≤ τ L . For our question, this is the interesting regime. Assumption 4 will imply that, in our
model, the H trader’s incentive-compatibility constraint is slack.
Finally, we are interested in equilibria in which screening is possible. In first-best, incentive
compatibility for the low types obtains if f (R∗)uH∗ ≤ uL∗ holds. Participation constraints will
not bind due to the full-coverage Assumption 1.
If, on the other hand, f (R∗)uH∗ > uL∗, the low trader’s IC constraint will be binding in
equilibrium.10 Consequently, banks will distort H traders’ contracts to prevent the L traders from
mimicking. Our final assumption on the competition parameters guarantees that banks can use
r H to separate the two types in this case.
9 See Tirole (1988).
10 It is easy to see that if, instead, high-type incentive compatibility were binding, uL = uH , a bank could always
improve profits by either slightly raising uH or slightly lowering uL , making both IC constraints slack.
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Assumption 5. For some r¯ H > R∗ large enough, f (r¯ H )(π H (r¯ H ) − τ H ) < π L(R∗) − τ L . Also,
r¯ H < −( dqH1
dqH0
)−1|qH0 =0.
This assumption implies that bonus ratio r H can be used to separate types: there exists
a level r H high enough such that L does not want to mimic H , who receives π H (r¯ H ) − τ H .
Basically, we make the natural assumption that as r H increases, either f (r H ) or π H (r H ) becomes
sufficiently low that Assumption 5 holds. The second part of the assumption allows us to avoid
corner solutions where qH0 = 0, and raising r H has no further impact on the project undertaken
by the H trader.
In the next section, we show that, when faced with IC constraints from adverse selection,
the banks may resort to a distortion in H ’s bonus ratio r H to values exceeding R∗, inducing H
traders to pursue higher risk projects than socially optimal. The extent of this distortion depends
on the endogenous outside option resulting from imperfect competition for traders among the
two banks.
3. Analysis
 To analyze the equilibrium contract menu offers by the two banks, we first show that we can
restrict attention to contracts that have no fixed wage part for high-type traders, and only a fixed
wage for the low types.
Lemma 1. It is optimal to offer H a full bonus contract with t H = 0 and wH0,1 ≥ 0, and to offer L
a fixed rate contract, with t L = uL and r L = R∗.
In order to prevent L from mimicking H , the bank pays H using bonus payments only
(no fixed rate). As H is better at generating returns, these bonus payments make the H contract
unattractive for the L-type. Indeed, as f (r ) ≤ 1 in the low type’s IC constraint (8), shifting
payments from t H to bonus payment uH − t H relaxes the constraint. Exactly because H is the
better trader, the incentive to mimic L is reduced by setting wL0,1 = 0. The high type’s IC (13)
is more easily satisfied if we shift payment from bonus uL − t L to fixed payment t L . As L is
indifferent, he chooses the project that maximizes the bank’s payoff, and, as previously stated, we
define r L = R∗ in this case.
We can now turn to the analysis of the optimal contracts in our Hotelling model. Bank a
optimizes its profits given the contract offered by bank b, subject to the two IC constraints for the
traders. Using Lemma 1, we can write bank a’s optimization program as:
max








)− uL)+ sH (uH , uHb ) (π H (r H ) − uH) (16)
s.t. uL ≥ uH f (r H )
uH ≥ uL,
where sL(uLa , u
L
b ) represents bank a’s share of L traders, as in equation (4), when bank a offers them
utility uLa and bank b offers u
L
b . By our full-coverage Assumption 1, we can ignore participation
constraints and we have inelastic total supply of traders, so that sL(uLa , u
L
b ) + sL(uLb , uLa ) = φ,
whereφ ∈ 〈0, 1〉 denotes the share of L traders. Similar remarks hold for H ’s shares: sH (uHa , uHb ) +
sH (uHb , u
H
a ) = 1 − φ.
The first part of the maximand in (16) represents bank a’s net gains from L’s activities.
The second component reflects H ’s contribution to the bank’s profit. For bank b, symmetric
expressions apply. As we focus on symmetric equilibria, both banks evenly share the number of
H as well as L traders in equilibrium. The first constraint is L’s IC condition, in which we use
t H = 0 from Lemma 1. The second is H ’s IC condition (with t L = uL).
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The characterization of the symmetric equilibrium hinges onwhether incentive compatibility
is binding in first-best. Note first that, from Assumption 4, H -type traders get more rents in an
environment with symmetric information. Consequently, the H -types’ IC wil not bind. We can
therefore identify two regimes, depending on whether the L-types’ IC binds in first-best or not,
as follows:11
Proposition 1. For given τ H , τ L ,
 if f (R∗)(π H (R∗) − τ H ) ≤ π L(R∗) − τ L , then banks offer contracts such that r L = r H = R∗;
 if f (R∗)(π H (R∗) − τ H ) > π L(R∗) − τ L , then banks offer contracts such that r L = R∗ and
r H > R∗.
In the first case, first-best is realized.Although an H -type gets higher utility, uH∗ = π H (R∗) −
τ H , than an L-type (who receives uL∗ = π L(R∗) − τ L), the wedge between the two is not too large.
The bank offers separating contracts where the L trader receiving uL∗ does not want to mimic H
(this is what uH∗ f (R∗) ≤ uL∗ means). There is no reason to distort r H in this case. Neither does
H want to mimic L , so that r L is not distorted either. Following Lemma 1, the L-types get a fixed
wage t L = uL∗, and by assumption execute the bank-optimal contract. H -types obtain a contract
consisting only of bonus payments, with optimal bonus ratio r H = R∗.
In the second case, the ratio of first-best utilities uH∗/uL∗ is so high that an L-type being
offered utility uL∗ would like to mimic H , as f (R∗)uH∗ > uL∗. To separate the types, the bank
will distort r H > R∗ to make it harder for L to mimic H . The intuition is that, as L is not so apt
at taking risks, setting r H > R∗ reduces L’s utility from the bonus contract offered to H . In other
words, to prevent the high wages offered to H from spilling over to L , the preferred choice is to
offer them in the form of bonuses on good outcomes x1, which are more valuable to H than to L .
The cost of doing so, for the bank, is that these wages induce H to execute suboptimal projects.
As these first-best utilities depend on the competition parameters τ H,L , the crucial conse-
quence of Proposition 1 is that banks induce inefficiently high risk taking for H traders if the H
labor market is sufficiently competitive: given τ L , the distortion in the high-types’ bonus ratio
r H emerges for τ H low enough. In that case, the value of the H traders’ rents is sufficiently high
relative to the L traders’.
We are interested in comparative statics in τ H in the case where competition for H traders
is so intense that banks induce inefficient risk taking by these traders. That is, we focus on the
case where f (R∗)(π H (R∗) − τ H ) > π L(R∗) − τ L .
As explained in the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix, multiple symmetric equilibria
cannot be ruled out in this case. Ifmultiple equilibria exist, wemake the following two assumptions
to deal with this: (i) π H (r H ) is concave in r H and (ii) banks coordinate on the symmetric
equilibrium which maximizes the sum of their profits. We know from Lemma 2 in the Appendix
that π H (r H ) is quasiconcave in r H ; assumption (i) is (a bit) more restrictive than this. Assumption
(ii) implies that banks play the coalition proof equilibrium.
Our second result is that banks incentivize top traders to take more risk as competition for
top traders intensifies, that is, the risk problem becomes worse as τ H falls.
Proposition 2. Banks induce H traders to take more risk by increasing r H as competition for H
traders increases (τ H falls).
The intuition for this result is, that, as τ H falls, H traders switch banksmore easily to increase
their income. In that case, banks experience stronger gains to increasing H traders’ wages uH
to win them over, at the expense of the rival bank. In the symmetric equilibrium, banks do not
11 Weneed to add some additional technical assumptions tomake sure the symmetric equilibrium exists; in particular,
ruling out deviations in which one firm either takes all agents in the markets (cornering) or abandons one type of trader
completely to its rival (exclusion). We explore sufficient conditions for this in Appendix B.
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benefit from this race to offer higher wages to the H trader. To the contrary, IC also forces banks
to increase wages for L traders. In an attempt to keep this leakage of rents to L traders low, banks
raise r H : the marginal benefits to raising r H increase, whereas the marginal costs (in terms of
less-efficient projects initiated by the H trader), remain the same.
4. Policy implications
 In the wake of the financial crisis, there has been much debate on curtailing bankers’
bonuses, in a bid to reduce bank risk taking. Whereas the benefits of reducing top executives’ risk
appetites are little disputed, the desirability of intervention in wage contracts lower in the bank
hierarchy might be less obvious. If bank management internalizes the risk of negative outcomes,
for example, through higher equity stakes in the bank, one might be tempted to argue that their
risk attitudes trickle down to the lower trader echelons through the contracts these are offered.
In this section, we point out that this view should be qualified, by looking at two implications
of our model. First, direct intervention in wage contracts helps to reduce excessive risk taking.
Second, leverage restrictions on the banks (the principals) do not necessarily alleviate excessive
risk taking by traders (the agents).
 Wage contract intervention. We first consider a bonus cap policy, in which a regulator
limits risk taking incentives by imposing a cap R¯ on bonus structure that binds for the high-type
trader, so that r H = R¯. We assume that the cap R¯ is larger than the first-best bonus structure R∗.
We are interested in both total welfare, and in the distributional effects of changing the cap R¯.
We assume both banks compete for traders andwill both be subject to the same regulation. To-
tal welfare is given by the sum of bank profits and trader utilityW = φπ L(R∗) + (1 − φ)π H (r H ).
Thus, the effect on welfare is simply the effect of r H on π H (r H ), wages being transfers.12 If the
cap is binding, rH = R¯, a reduction in R¯ brings bonus structure closer to the socially optimal
value of R∗.
The distributional effects of reducing a binding regulatory bonus cap are more ambiguous.
On the one hand, lowering the industry-wide cap R¯ makes it harder to screen low-type traders,
and a larger leakage of rents from high to low types takes place, making banks more reluctant to
pay for top talent. On the other hand, the competitive externality among both banks led them to
raise bonus structure R excessively, harming profits from the top type in a bid to shed low-type
traders to their rival. Capping r H reduces this competitive externality, increasing profits from the
high-type sector, which makes it more attractive for banks to compete for these types. Depending
on the size of lost profits due to excessive risk taking, either effect can dominate.
Proposition 3. A reduction in the binding bonus cap R¯ ≥ R∗, leads to:
 increased total welfare,
 higher utility for low-type traders,
whereas the effect on high types and bank profits can go either way.
Should we expect banks to introduce such wage measures voluntarily? Clearly, one bank will
not find it profitable to introduce bonus caps unilaterally. A bank could choose a lower r H itself
but this is not optimal. For given uH , a lower r H would force the bank to increase uL , which is
costly; or it would force the bank to reduce uH , which reduces its market, share on the H market,
which is not profitable either.
Should we then expect banks to lobby the government to introduce bonus regulation? In our
closed economy duopoly, the model predicts that banks might lobby for such an intervention, if
indeed the profit loss from the competitive externality, imposing excessive risk on the high types,
12 Assuming we continue to have full coverage for both types.
C© The RAND Corporation 2018.
868 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
is large. In an internationally competitive market such as banking, having one country regulating
bonuses is not beneficial for its home banks. They will lose H traders to banks in other countries.
Hence, bonus regulation can only be profitable for banks if it happens on a global scale.
From the country’s perspective, it can still be welfare enhancing to introduce bonus regula-
tion. The trade-off for the government is then higher efficiency due to less risk taking by traders,
versus making home banks less attractive for top traders.
Taxing traders’ pay is an alternative policy to address excessive risk taking. If traders only
receive a fraction 1 − θ of the utility paid to them by their employers (where θ denotes the
marginal tax rate), the banks’ profit functions change: the fraction of traders attracted by bank
a now depends on (1 − θ )(uHa − uHb ). As can be seen from the Hotelling specification, (4), this
effectively increases the travel cost τ H , muting labor market competition among banks and
reducing the competitive externality. As a result, equilibrium r H will be reduced.
Summarizing, directly intervening in the traders’ wage structure is an effective policy for
governments to reduce risk taking. As discussed in the Introduction, this finding is in line with
Be´nabou and Tirole (2016). However, in our context of bank regulation, it has been argued that
changing banks’ objective functions is a better way to reduce excessive risk taking. In particular,
the argument goes, forcing banks to hold more equity—reducing leverage—so that they stand
to lose more in case of bankruptcy will lead banks to reduce bonuses and hence risk taking. We
investigate this next.
 Leverage restrictions. We argue that with excessive bonuses due to competition between
banks for top traders, direct intervention in the wage structure can be more effective in reducing
risk than increasing banks’ equity. We make this point by going through an example where one
role of the bonus—separating trader types—is emphasized. In this example, increasing equity
requirements for banks actually increases risk taking. The point of the example is to illustrate this
counterintuitive effect, which reduces the effectiveness of leverage restrictions. We do not claim
that this effect always dominates in the real world.
To see this effect, let E denote the bank’s equity. With equity taken into account, we can
write the bank’s gross profit (5) from trader type j as
q j1 (x1 + E) + q j0 (x0 + E) + q j−1 max{E − x−1, 0} − E, (17)
with j = H, L . Positive profits from the project are added to existing equity, losses are paid out
of equity but up to the point of the bank’s liability that is limited to available equity. We assume
that the bad state is so “catastrophic” that E − x−1 < 0 for the values of E that we consider. Then,
we can write this gross return as
q j1 x1 + q j0 x0 − q j−1E . (18)
The higher the bank’s equity stake E , the more the bank loses in the bad state. More generally,
going bankrupt has negative external effects on debt holders and the government—in case the
government pays for a bailout. Due to the rise in E , the bank internalizes more of these external
effects. The bank’s objective and the social objective get better aligned.
By comparing equations (5) and (18), we see that changing E is equivalent to doing com-
parative statics with respect to x−1. Hence, in our model, the question becomes: does increasing
x−1 lead to lower r H and hence less risk taking by top traders?
At first sight, it seems intuitive that raising x−1 reduces a bank’s preference for risk and hence
reduces r H . Indeed, this can happen in our model. However, this is not necessarily the case due
to the fact that r H plays two roles: (i) it affects top traders’ preference for risk (moral hazard) and
(ii) it separates H -and L-types (adverse selection). In the latter role, an increase in x−1 can raise
r H .
The intuition for this is as follows. An increase in x−1 increases the bank’s aversion to
negative outcomes in the bad state. Negative outcomes result both from H projects, and from
those of L traders. If the latter create the larger downside risk, banks tend to reduce L’s utility
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uL in an effort to lose L traders to the rival bank as x−1 increases. They will do so by increasing
r H if this is not too costly (and it will not be costly if an H -type’s project choice is rather
inelastic with respect to r H ). In this way, banks impose a competitive externality on each other. In
equilibrium, banks do not succeed in shedding L traders; both banks continue to share L traders
evenly, so the increase in H ’s risk r H does not help them to reduce exposure to L’s downside
risks.
To formalize this intuition,we consider the casewhere only the second role of r H—separating
types—plays a role. We assume that H traders are completely inelastic with respect to r H . Say,
there is an obvious best project—irrespective of r H—that H traders can identify but L traders
cannot.13 This is extreme, but by continuity, the result also holds for the case where H traders
are rather—but not fully—inelastic with respect to r H , and raising r H does lower the value of the
H -type’s project.
The assumption implies that π Hr = 0 and hence, both uL and uH can be set at their first-best
values given by equations (14) and (15). Indeed, because π Hr = 0, IC issues can be resolved
with r H at no cost and hence, there is no reason to distort uL, uH . Using that uL = f (r H )uH , the
first-order conditions for uH and r H can be written as
uH f (r H ) = π L(R∗) − τ L (19)
uH = π H (r H ) − τ H . (20)
Combining these two equations, we find(
π H (r H ) − τ H) f (r H ) = π L(R∗) − τ L .





x−1 − π Hx−1 f (r H )
f ′(r H )(π H (r H ) − τ H ) ,
where
π Lx−1 = −qL−1 < 0, π Hx−1 = −qH−1 < 0.
If, in the optimum, L’s probability of the bad state, qL−1, is larger than H ’s probability, we find
dr H
dx−1
> 0, that is, H ’s bonus ratio increases with x−1. As mentioned, the example of fixed project
choice is extreme, but the analysis continues to hold if H ’s probabilities, qH1,0,−1(p(r
H )), change
sufficiently slowly with r H , so that dπ H/dr H is small in equilibrium. Summarizing, we have
shown the following.
Proposition 4. When banks compete for traders, an increase in equity requirements can increase,




As mentioned, our claim is not that equity requirements always increase risk taking. Indeed,
there is the moral hazard effect which leads the bank to reduce r H in response to an increase in
E , as one would expect. However, the adverse selection effect moves in the opposite direction,
making this measure less effective than one would expect if L traders are at least as likely to
trigger the bad state as H traders. Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether bank failures
are either caused by top traders taking calculated risks or by less-talented traders making huge
mistakes.
We conclude that measures aimed at reducing bank risk only at the top of the bank hierarchy
may have unintentional effects on the risk attitudes of individual bank traders. These effects result
13 In Figure 1, this might be represented by a kink in the high type’s boundary curve.
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from a combination of agency problems within the banks, and spillover effects mediated through
competition on the labor market among banks. Directly regulating bonus pay also at lower bank
levels can therefore be a useful complement to measures regulating bank risk at the top levels.
5. Concluding remarks
 We provide a model rationalizing the claim that increased competition for traders forces
banks to execute riskier deals. The mechanism for excessive risk taking we describe here is
different from the usual one, where banks fail to fully internalize the losses. In the present model,
even if banks fully internalize the costs of negative outcomes, banks offer traders excessively
risky contracts to screen on trader type and to minimize transfers to lower skilled employees.
We have two main results. First, banks offer riskier contracts (higher bonus ratio r H ) as
competition for top traders intensifies (τ H falls). When competition increases, the rents banks
have to pay to attract top traders increase. To avoid leakage of these rents to average traders, the
higher payment comes in the form of contracts paying larger bonuses and hence, inducing more
risk taking by top traders.
Second, caps on bonuses mitigate the adverse welfare effects we identify. In contrast, raising
capital requirements does not necessarily result in banks offering traders contracts that reduce risk
taking. If average traders create more downside risk than top traders, banks that are confronted
with a higher liability for losses may increase r H in an effort to lose the lower-skilled traders
to rival banks: higher r H will reduce these traders’ utility. Consequently, bonus payments to top
traderswill not automatically decreasewhen higher capital requirements force banks to internalize
a larger fraction of potential losses.
Although a regulator faces the same adverse selection over trader types as the banks do, a
planner will not resort to inefficient screening by offering excessive incentives. The reason is that
whereas banks distort production to change the distribution of profits among themselves and the
traders, for the regulator, these payments are pure transfers.14 Therefore, there is a role for direct
intervention in compensation structures, aimed at reducing trader incentives toward risk taking.
This leaves the question why competition over skilled traders should have increased in the
buildup to the present financial crisis. One explanation could be that competition in financial
institutions’ product markets intensified as well. As firms face stiffer competition in attracting
clients, a competitive advantage becomes more valuable, and top traders may provide such an
advantage. The competition over traders in our model would, in that case, be a reduced form of
competition in product markets.
Appendix A
This appendix contains the proofs of Lemma 1 and propositions 1, 2 and 3.
Proof of Lemma 1. First, note that we can focus on contracts that have w ji ≥ 0 for i = 1, 0, j = H, L . To see this, we
write a bank’s net profits from trader j as
q j1 (p)
(
x1 − w j1
)+ q j0 (p) (x0 − w j0)− q j−1(p)x−1 − t j = π j − u j . (A1)
Hence, for given value of u j , there is no benefit in rent distribution for the bank in distorting bonuses w ji ; for example,
choosing negative bonuses compensated by higher t j . So, we need to check whether there are beneficial incentive effects
of setting w ji < 0.
If both w j1 and w
j
0 were to be chosen negative, the trader would choose the (interior) project which fails surely,
q−1 = 1; q0 = q1 = 0, an outcome that is never optimal for the bank. If, say w j1 < 0 and w j0 ≥ 0, the trader would avoid
risky projects and maximize his utility by choosing the safe project with q0 = 1. The same outcome would be realized
with w j1 = 0; hence, we can focus on w j1 ≥ 0 without loss of generality. A similar argument holds if w j0 < 0 and w j1 ≥ 0.
Next, on inspection of both IC constraints, noting that f (r ) ≤ 1, L’s IC constraint (8) is relaxed if we shift H
income from fixed component t H to bonus component uH − t H . As the agents are risk-neutral, we can restrict our analysis
14 In our stylized model, aggregate trader supply is completely inelastic. When supply of traders is elastic, the
regulator will be concerned about the level of trader utility, but not to the degree that a bank is.
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to H contracts that pay out fully in terms of bonuses, that is, t H = 0. Vice versa, H ’s IC constraint (13) is relaxed by
shifting weight away from bonuses, toward the fixed component. Because wL0,1 ≥ 0, we can therefore choose uL = t L , set
bonuses wL0,1 = 0, and allow the bank to specify L’s project to be the first-best one. In this case, we define r L = R∗. 
Proof of Proposition 1. We first show that net profits π j (r j ) for either type are maximized at the solution of the first-order
equation, r j = R∗. This is implied by the following lemma:
Lemma 2. The function π j (r j ) is quasiconcave in r j ≥ 0.







This relation defines a function q j0 (r
j ) with dq j0 /dr
j ≤ 0. From equation (5), we can then compute
π jr (r
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∗) = 0, and π j is monotonically
decreasing for r j > R∗. Hence, π j (r j ) is quasiconcave in r j . 
Let us now focus on the bank’s constrained optimization problem. As is known from the literature on countervailing
incentives—see Laffont and Martimort (2002) for the case with two types—we check whether or not the IC constraint is
actually binding.
First, if f (R∗)(π H (R∗) − τ H ) ≤ π L (R∗) − τ L , IC is not an issue and the main text explains that R∗ can be
implemented.
The IC constraint is binding in the efficient outcome if
f (R∗)
(
π H (R∗) − τ H ) > π L (R∗) − τ L . (A2)
Given contract offers r H = r L = R∗, L accepts the H contract. We proceed by assuming that (A2) holds and characterize
the equilibrium for this case.
Taking into account that the low type’s IC binds, we rewrite optimization problem (16) as
max
r L ,uH ,r H
sL ( f (r H )uH , uLb )(π
L (r L ) − f (r H )uH ) + sH (uH , uHb )(π H (r H ) − uH ). (A3)
The first-order condition for r L implies that r L = R∗, the L contract is not distorted (“no distortion at the top”), as is to
be expected. The first-order conditions for uH and r H can be written as




π L (R∗) − uH f (r H ) − τ L)+ 1 − φ
2τ H
(
π H (r H ) − uH − τ H ) = 0 (Uuc)




π L (R∗) − uH f (r H ) − τ L)+ 1 − φ
2
π Hr (r
H ) = 0. (Urc)
The solutions to these first-order conditions correspond to two curves in (r H , uH ) space. Denoting the curves with capital
U , we refer to these curves as the utility curve Uuc(r H ) and the risk curve Urc(r H ), resp. Note that these curves are
continuous functions of r H .
It will be convenient to also introduce the IC curve, which measures (as a function of r H ) H ’s utility at which L is
indifferent between his first-best contract and the H contract. This curve is defined as
Uic(r H ) = π
L (R∗) − τ L
f (r H )
. (Uic)
At all points (uH , r H ) with uH ≥ Uic(r H ), L’s IC constraint is binding—which we assume to be the case.
An equilibrium is a pair uH , r H that simultaneously solves both first-order equations (Uuc) and (Urc), and therefore
corresponds to an intersection of the risk and the utility curves, Uuc(r H ) = Urc(r H ). This is illustrated in Figure A1.
We use the following lemma below.
Lemma 3. With the optimal R∗—defined in equation (2)—we have
(i) Urc(R∗) = Uic(R∗)
(ii) Urc(r H ) > Uic(r H ) if and only if r H > R∗
(iii) Uuc(R∗) > Uic(R∗).
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FIGURE A1
EQUILIBRIUM IS AT THE INTERSECTION OF THE RISK AND UTILITY CURVES. [Color figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
R
The lemma states that at the optimal R∗ the risk curve intersects the IC curve, while the utility curve lies above
it. This shows that if there is an equilibrium at finite r H > R∗—characterized by an intersection of both curves—the
risk curve Urc(r H ) will cross the utility curve from below. We use this property when doing comparative statics in
Proposition 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. When inserting uH = Uic(R∗) in the risk curve equation (Urc), the first term vanishes and we are left
with π Hr (r
H ) = 0, which is indeed solved by r H = R∗. This proves (i). For r H > R∗, π Hr (r H ) < 0 and the first term in
equation (Urc) has to be positive. Because f ′(r H ) < 0, this implies thatUrc(r H ) f (r H ) > π L (R∗) − τ L = Uic(r H ) f (r H ).
Similarly, r H < R∗ leads toUrc(r H ) < Uic(r H ). This proves (ii). Finally, for the utility curve, assume (iii) does not hold, so
Uuc(R∗) ≤ Uic(R∗). Then, by the definition of the utility curve, (Uuc), we would have that π H (R∗) −Uuc(R∗) − τ H ≤ 0,
or π H (R∗) − τ H ≤ Uuc(R∗) ≤ Uic(R∗). However, this conflicts with our assumption (A2) that at R∗, IC does not hold.
So, (iii) must hold. 
It follows from (A2) that the intersection of the risk curve and the utility curve must lie beyond the privately optimal
value R∗. To see this, suppose that r H < R∗ would be an intersection of Uuc and Urc . Then uH lies below Uic and the
L trader’s IC constraint does not bind. Thus, there is no reason to distort r H and R∗ can be implemented. However, this
contradicts (A2).
Finally, the sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium (Assumption 5) is equivalent toUuc(r¯ H ) = Uic(r¯ H ), as
can be verified by setting uH f (r¯ H ) = π L (R∗) − τ L in equation (Uuc). By Lemma 3 (i) and (iii), the risk curve is below
the utility curve at r H = R∗, whereas by (ii), the risk curve is above the IC curve Uic(r H ) for all r H > R∗. If the utility
curve Uuc(r H ) crosses the IC curve at r¯ H , it must have intersected the risk curve at least once at some r H ∈ 〈R∗, r¯ H 〉.
This point of intersection corresponds with a symmetric equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 2. If there is only one intersection of the curves Uuc and Urc , the latter intersects the former from
below—as illustrated in Figure A1.
However, we cannot exclude that multiple intersections of curves Uuc and Urc exist. If there are multiple intersec-





H f ′′(r H )(π L (R∗) − uH f (r H ) − τ L ) − (uH )2 f ′(r H )2 + π Hrr (r H )
f ′(r H )(π L (R∗) − 2uH f (r H ) − τ L ) > 0, (A4)
because f ′(r H ) < 0 byAssumption 2; f ′′(r H ) ≥ 0 byAssumption 3;π L (R∗) − 2uH f (r H ) − τ L < π L (R∗) − uH f (r H ) −
τ L < 0 by equation (Urc); and π Hrr < 0 by assumption. However, the utility curve is not necessarily monotonically
decreasing.
If there are multiple intersections, we focus on the one with lowest r H . The following lemma demonstrates that this
lowest-r H equilibrium is the one that is preferred by both banks, as it maximizes total profits. 
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Lemma 4. If there are multiple equilibria, and π H (r H ) is concave in r H for r H > R∗, total firm profits are maximized at
the equilibrium with lowest r H .
Proof of Lemma 4. Total bank profits in any symmetric equilibrium (uH , r H ) are given by
tot (uH , r H ) = φ(π L (R∗) − uH f (r H )) + (1 − φ)(π H (r H ) − uH ).
We show that these profits tot (uH , r H ) are decreasing as one moves along the risk curve Urc(r H ) to higher r H , that is,
dtot
dr H
(Urc(r H ), r H ) < 0. Because any symmetric equilibrium (uH , r H ) should lie on the risk curve, this will prove the
lemma.
When a bank sets uH , there is the individual bank benefit of increasing the share of profitable H traders. This
disappears in tot and hence, the negative effect of increasing utility for both L and H traders dominates. A decrease
in uH (here via a reduction in r H along the Urc curve) always raises tot . As Urc(r H ) increases monotonically with r H ,
the firms’ profits from high-type traders unambiguously increase with decreasing r H . However, this is not necessarily the




H f ′′(r H )(π L (R∗) − uH f (r H ) − τ L ) + π Hrr (r H )
f ′(r H )(π L (R∗) − 2uH f (r H ) − τ L ) f (r
H ) + u
H f ′(r H )(π L (R∗) − uH f (r H ) − τ L )
π L (R∗) − 2uH f (r H ) − τ L . (A5)
The first term is positive, but the second one is negative and the net result may be negative. The term −φuH f (r H ) in the
profit function may therefore create a positive contribution to the derivative of total profits,tot . We can see, nevertheless,
that the offending positive term in the change in total profits, is always outweighed by the negative contribution from the
high types:
(1 − φ)π Hr (r H ) = −uH f ′(r H )φ
π L (R∗) − uH f (r H ) − τ L
τ L
,
which follows from the equation for the risk curve (Urc). Comparison with the second term in (A5) makes clear that their
net contribution to d
tot
dr H
(Urc(r H ), r H ) is again negative,
−φ u
H f ′(r H )(π L (R∗) − uH f (r H ) − τ L )
π L (R∗) − 2uH f (r H ) − τ L − u
H f ′(r H )φ




π L (R∗) − 2uH f (r H ) < 0.
However, as uH f (r H ) > π L (R∗) − τ L = u∗ (as IC is binding), we have
π L (R∗) − 2uH f (r H ) < τ L − uH f (r H ) < τ L − u∗ < 0,
where the last inequality follows from our Assumption of full market coverage, Assumption 1, τ L − u∗ < −u¯L < 0. 
By Lemma 3, the equilibrium corresponds to an intersection of the risk and utility curves where the risk curve
intersects the utility curve from below. Only the utility curve depends on competition τ H . It is straightforward to verify






Hence, for any given r H , a decrease in τ H causes the utility curve to shift upward. As a result, the intersection shifts to
the right, to higher r H . 
Proof of Proposition 3. Total welfare is the sum of profits and trader utilities. As we have full coverage, both banks share
the entire market for traders, and wages are only transfers which do not affect total welfare. Hence, bringing the cap closer
to the first-best level R∗ increases total welfare.
If the constraint binds and both banks set r H = R¯, the first-order conditions for uH yield a symmetric equilibrium
uH = π
H (R¯) − τ H + f (R¯)(π L (R∗) − τ L )
1 + f (R¯)2 ,
and uL = f (R¯)uH . As f and π H are decreasing in R¯, the derivative of uL is always negative. A tighter cap then
increases low-type traders’ utilities. To see that the effect on high-type utility is ambiguous, let us consider the case where
π L (R∗) − τ L is negligible compared to π H (R¯) − τ H , so that only the first term matters. It is then straightforward to see
that if π H is relatively flat, the decrease in f with R¯ dominates to increase uH with R¯. Also, vice versa, if f is relatively
flat, the profit effect will dominate and uH decreases with R¯.
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In the same example where π L − τ L is negligible, total trader utility is
uH + uL ∼ 1 + f (R¯)
1 + f (R¯)2 (π
H (R¯) − τ H ),
which for slowly varying π H has a derivative the sign of which depends on the magnitude of f (R¯). Because bank profits,
for slowly varying π H , change negatively with trader rents, also the derivative of profits can have either sign. 
Appendix B
In this appendix, to verify that the symmetric solution to the first-order equations is an equilibrium, we first find sufficient
conditions that deviations involving exclusion of either type are not profitable. Then, we check for sufficient conditions
so that cornering the market for some type is not profitable either.
Lemma 5 (excluding the low types). For the proportion of low types, φ, sufficiently high, exclusion of low types is not a
profitable deviation.
Proof. Denoting the rival’s symmetric solution contracts by (uˆH , rˆ H ) and (uˆL , rˆ L ), with rˆ L = R∗ and uˆL = uˆH f (rˆ H ), we
explore a potential deviation (uH , r H ) that attracts some high types but excludes the low types. This implies that
uH > uˆH + τ H , uH f (r H ) ≤ uˆH f (rˆ H ) − τ L .
We now ask whether adding a contract for the low types, (uL , R∗), increases profits for this potential deviation. Such a
profitable contract exists if there is a uL such that
uL > uˆH f (rˆ H ) − τ L , and π L (R∗) − uL > 0,
or
π L (R∗) > uˆH f (rˆ H ) − τ L .
Now note that from the first-order conditions for uˆH , (equation Uuc), this is guaranteed as long as the proportion
of low types φ is sufficiently large. In that case, π L (R∗) − uˆH f (rˆ H ) − τ L can be arbitrarily small (negative), so that
π L (R∗) − uˆH f (rˆ H ) + τ L is positive. 
Lemma 6 (excluding the high types). Excluding the high types will not be a profitable deviation if
π L (R∗) − 2τ L > f (R∗)(π H (R∗) − 2τ H ).
Proof. Suppose we only have a contract for the low types, uL ≥ uˆL − τ L , that does not attract any high types, uL <
uˆH − τ H . We will show that we can then find a profitable and incentive-compatible contract (uH , r H ) that attracts some
high types as well. This will be the case for
uH f (r H ) ≤ uL , uH > uˆH − τ H , and π H (r H ) − uH > 0.





Because uL > uˆL − τ L , we will certainly attract high types if
uˆL − τ L > f (R∗)(uˆH − τ H ).
As uˆ > π L (R∗) − τ L , and uˆH < π H (rˆ H ) − τ H , a sufficient condition for this to hold is
π L (R∗) − 2τ L > f (R∗)(π H (R∗) − 2τ H ).
Next, we need to verify that this contract leads to positive profits. This requires
u
f (R∗)
< π H (R∗).
Either this holds, or, if it does not, we can alternatively pick a contract uH = π H (R∗) − , r H = R∗ which in that case
satisfies incentive compatibility, attracts high types, and is profitable. 
Lemma 7 (cornering). Cornering will not be a profitable deviation if the fraction of low types φ is large enough, and if
τ L − τ H < 1
2
τ H (1 − f (R∗)).
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Proof. Cornering happens if either uH > uˆH + τ H , or uL > uˆL + τ L , or both. We can rule out the last alternative, as
we could then always jointly lower offered utilities such that incentive compatibility remains satisfied. Consider then,
cornering on the low-type market only. So, assume that we have contracts with
uH ≤ uˆH + τ H , and uL > uˆL + τ L .
We will be able to reduce uL unless incentive compatibility binds, so that uL = uH f (r H ). Now, consider the first-order
conditions for uH ,
φ f (r H ) + (1 − φ)sH − (1 − φ)(π
H (r H ) − uH )
2τ H
= 0,
where sH ≤ 1 is the high-type market share. Provided that f (r H ) is bounded away from zero, if the fraction of low types
φ is high, this cannot be satisfied for 0 ≤ sH ≤ 1 and uH ≤ π H (r H ).
Next, suppose we have cornering for the high types, uH > uˆH + τ H , while uL ≤ uˆL + τ L . We can then profitably
reduce uH unless incentive compatibility for the high types binds, uH = uL . In that case, we require that both
uL > uˆH + τ H , and uL ≤ uˆH f (rˆ H ) + τ L ,
which cannot hold if
uˆH + τ H > uˆH f (rˆ H ) + τ L .
A sufficient condition for that inequality to hold is
τ L − τ H < 1
2
τ H (1 − f (R∗)) < uˆH (1 − f (rˆ H )),
as uˆH > 1
2
τ H (full coverage) and rˆ H > R∗. 
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